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SUMMARY
Who pays and how much? These are crucial questions for any tax system and, given the complexity of 
the economy, they are also among the most difficult to answer. This paper undertakes an analysis of the 
distribution of taxes and transfers in Canada using a static approach based on annual income combined 
with the novel approach of breaking down taxpayers by age cohort. The paper examines how tax rates net 
of transfers differ by age and income group, and how those rates change over taxpayers’ lifetimes. It clearly 
reveals the progressive nature of Canada’s tax system. In our base case scenario, when all age cohorts 
are considered together and transfers are treated as negative taxes, the first two quintiles of the income 
distribution are net recipients of government transfers with negative net tax rates equal to about -48 percent 
for the first quintile and -33 percent for the second quintile. For middle to high-income individuals net tax 
rates are positive and increase with income, from 10 percent for the median group, to 24 percent for the 
fourth quintile and 34 percent for the fifth quintile. Looking at net tax rates by age cohort, we find that overall 
the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution is a net recipient of fiscal transfers at all ages. However, on 
average for individuals 65 and over all but the top 20 percent of the income distribution are net recipients 
of fiscal transfers, with negative net tax rates. The age related redistributive nature of Canada’s tax system 
is further emphasized by an examination of the Gini coefficients for each age cohort, calculated here for the 
first time. Starting at age 30, before taxes and transfers income inequality is found to rise monotonically 
with age, leveling off at 65. Taxes and transfers reduce the degree of income inequality significantly for all 
ages, but substantially more so for the elderly due to age related features of the tax and transfer system. 
If redistribution can be thought of as a one of the fundamental features of the tax and transfer system in 
Canada, the extent to which it is targeted at the elderly is an important secondary feature.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to study the distribution of income and the incidence of taxes and transfers 
in Canada. To conduct the analysis, various assumptions are used to estimate average tax rates on 
different income groups, taking into account almost all forms of taxes and transfers at the federal and 
provincial level. No matter which scenario is adopted, the overwhelming conclusion is that Canada’s 
tax and transfer system is quite progressive. Average tax rates double from 17 to 35 percent as income 
rises from the lowest to highest categories, when taxes are calculated as a share of income including 
government transfers. If transfers are viewed as negative taxes, the average tax rate rises from -48 
percent to 34 percent from lowest to highest income groups. Over age cohorts, we find that Canada’s tax/
transfer system substantially reduces income inequality with the greatest impact on retired seniors. 
There are several aspects of this study that are unique compared to previous tax incidence studies in 
Canada. 
Although we undertake a fairly standard static or annual tax incidence analysis, rather than adopting 
a lifetime approach, we parse the data by age cohort. This is in contrast to most static studies of tax 
incidence, which group all cohorts together.1 This cohort approach allows us to consider the distribution 
of the burden of the tax/transfer system both within and across age groups. 
Another unique aspect of the study is the manner in which we incorporate various shifting assumptions 
regarding the incidence of taxes and transfers. Particularly important here is our treatment of corporate 
income taxes, the burden of which is presumed to fall primarily on labour in our base case scenario. This 
is based upon evidence discussed below suggesting that much of the burden of the corporate income 
tax is transmitted to wage earners via lower wages, rather than to investors by way of a reduction in 
investment income. 
We also employ what we think is an innovative approach with regard to the treatment of the 
contributions and benefits associated with the Canada and Québec Pension Plan (CPP/QPP). We treat 
the CPP/QPP system as a hybrid tax/transfer and pure savings system. Using actuarial analysis, which 
calculates the effective internal rate of return on CPP/QPP contributions by year of birth, we determine 
for each age cohort the portion of CPP/QPP contributions that can be thought of as a tax versus saving, 
and the portion of benefits that can be viewed as a transfer versus a return to savings. This approach 
highlights the importance of undertaking a cohort analysis.
Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of income inequality within and across age cohorts. 
We calculate pre- and post-fisc Gini coefficients (a measure of the degree of income inequality) for each 
age cohort. This allows us to examine the manner in which income inequality varies across ages, and to 
determine the extent to which the tax and transfer system redistributes toward various age groups. We 
find that a substantial amount of income is redistributed to the elderly in Canada.
1 
An exception is a recent paper examining fiscal incidence in New Zealand: Omar Aziz, Norman Gemmell and Athene 
Laws, “The Distribution of Income and Fiscal Incidence by Age and Gender: Some Evidence from New Zealand,” Working 
Papers in Public Finance 10 (2013): Victoria Business School, Victoria University of Wellington.
2II. ASSESSING TAX INCIDENCE
Tax incidence asks the seemingly simple question: who bears the burden of taxes in society? Indeed, 
the distribution of the burden of taxation is one of the most fundamental issues of tax policy, most 
particularly in the public arena — most of the public discussion of tax policy concerns the distribution 
of taxes. It is perhaps trite to point out that politicians and the public agree that everyone should pay 
their “fair share” of taxes. However, it turns out that this is a very complicated and contentious issue, 
for two reasons. First, the very notion of fairness is a value judgment that varies across individuals and 
there is no reason to think that all citizens have a common view as to what is meant by fair taxation. For 
example, individuals might agree that those with similar circumstances and income should bear a similar 
tax burden (often referred to as horizontal equity). Moreover, many would also agree that those who are 
better off should pay more taxes since they have greater capacity to cover the cost of public services 
(referred to as vertical equity). In other words, the tax burden should rise with income. But then the 
questions arise: How much more? Proportionally more? Progressively more? 
Second, as is usual with most metrics, calculating the average tax burden for different income classes 
presents a host of theoretical and practical issues for analysis. It turns out that tax incidence is not 
a simple concept to measure. And in fact taxpayers who appear at first glance to bear the burden 
(incidence) of a tax may not bear the ultimate burden.
For the purposes of this paper, we will define a tax system to be progressive (regressive) if the average 
tax rate rises (falls) with income levels. There are other potential definitions of progressivity (such as 
rising marginal tax rates with income), but the conventional approach is to look at tax burdens in terms 
of average rates.
A critical question in any incidence study involves the determination of what fiscal policies to include in 
the analysis. Governments levy taxes to cover the cost of public services and to transfer income among 
households. Should tax incidence focus on taxes alone, ignoring transfers? Should income measures 
include transfers from governments? Or should transfers be viewed as negative taxes and therefore not 
included in income? The answers to these questions depend on whether one is interested in tax incidence 
for one part of the fiscal system, or the fiscal system as a whole, including government transfers.
One approach is to assess only tax burdens as tax payments relative to income that could either include 
transfers (broad income measure) or not (narrow income measure). Past tax incidence studies2 have 
often used the broad income measure, which involves adding government transfers to income since 
many transfers themselves are taxable. Tax incidence then focuses on actual taxes paid relative to the 
broad income received by individuals or households. This approach makes the tax system appear more 
progressive since transfers tend to provide greater support to lower income groups and therefore result 
in lower tax rates measured for low-income households. A narrow measure would tend to increase the 
measured tax rate at the low-income level.
In our view, however, it is appropriate to think of the redistributive impact of the overall fiscal system 
in Canada. From this perspective, transfers should be viewed as negative taxes and excluded from 
measured income. Further justification for this perspective lies in the fact that in the Canadian tax 
system, transfers and refundable tax credits have been used interchangeably. For example, child tax 
benefits have at different times taken the form of grants paid to households or refundable tax credits. 
2 
See, for example, Frank Vermaeten, W. Irwin Gillespie and Arndt Vermaeten, “Tax Incidence in Canada,” Canadian Tax 
Journal 42, no.2 (1994): 348-416, which provides a good survey of literature as well as a detailed analysis of tax incidence. 
3Another example is the refundable GST credit, which was instituted for the purpose of making the 
federal consumption tax progressive, not as a demogrant paid to low-income households.3 
To understand who bears the burden of taxation, it is critical to understand who ultimately pays the tax, 
which may differ from who bears the legal liability for the tax. While the legal liability is often clear, it 
turns out to be less informative, and even irrelevant, as to who bears the ultimate economic burden. This 
is due to the impact that taxes have on prices, wages, rates of return, etc., in the economy.
For example, the corporate income tax is legally payable by corporations. But corporations sell their 
goods and services to consumers, employ workers and pay a return on capital to owners — thus the 
common saying: “corporations don’t pay tax, people do.” And indeed, the burden of the corporate 
income tax may be distributed to some combination of consumers through higher prices, workers 
through lower wage rates, or shareholders through lower returns on their investment in the firm.4 
Similarly, while workers are legally responsible for paying personal income tax, it is possible through 
wage negotiations that some of the tax could be shifted forward onto the employer as higher wages paid, 
which therefore must be recovered through higher consumer prices that affect the purchasing power of 
household income.5 
There are several choices to be made in how tax incidence is modeled. The first concerns the use of a 
partial vs. a general equilibrium approach. General equilibrium models are large, complicated models 
of the economy which explicitly link the various sectors and allow prices, wages, rates of return, etc., 
to respond to changes in the tax and transfer system. Partial equilibrium analysis, on the other hand, is 
somewhat easier as it does not explicitly model the connections between the various markets and sectors. 
Our approach it to use insights from the general equilibrium literature to inform our choice of various 
shifting assumptions that underlie the analysis that is effectively a partial equilibrium approach.
Another issue is whether tax incidence should be based on individual or family income. Family 
income best reflects the economic income that households have to cover expenditure needs and things 
like shared housing costs. Further, households have different living arrangements — some are single 
individuals, others have two earners and no dependents and others consist of families. Moreover, in 
principle it would be appropriate to measure not only market income but also the non-market income 
realized by households due to home production (and leisure).6 While all of this is important, our age 
cohort approach necessitates the use of individual income.
Studies also differ in whether they examine annual tax incidence —a static, one-year snapshot of 
households— or lifetime incidence, which accounts for taxes paid by households over time. Most 
analysts would agree that the lifetime approach to tax incidence analysis is, in principle, superior. There 
are three main reasons for this conclusion. 
First, when looking at a snapshot of the economy for one year, young and retired individuals typically 
have less income than during the rest of their lifetime; indeed, our analysis shows this starkly. Therefore, 
the amount of tax paid by young workers and retirees would be less than that paid during the rest of 
3 
Piketty and Saez also argue in favour of treating transfers as negative taxes. See Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, 
“How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System?: A Historical and International Perspective,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21, no.1 (2007): 8-9.
4 We discuss the incidence of the corporate income tax in more detail below.
5 Douglas A. L. Auld and David A. Wilton, “The Impact of Progressive Income Tax Rates on Canadian Negotiated Wage 
Rates,” Canadian Journal of Economics 21, no.2 (1988): 279-284.
6 
An attempt at measuring the value of home production in income tax incidence across household is in Matt Krzepkowski 
and Jack Mintz, “How Income Splitting Can Bring Fairness to Canada’s Single-Income Families,” The School of Public 
Policy Research Series 6, no.15 (2013). Based on Statistics Canada studies, it is estimated that the 2011 average value of 
unpaid work of a stay-at-home spouse without children is $25,836, a premium over an employed spouse of $11,012.
4their lifetime, especially if the tax system is highly progressive with much higher tax burdens on those 
with higher incomes. Looking at a snapshot of incomes to assess tax burdens under the annual incidence 
approach is sensitive to the proportion of young and old to middle income workers and the growth in 
earnings. 
Second, annual incidence studies fail to properly assess tax burdens on savings and the return to 
investments, often leading to an underestimate of the progressivity of a tax system. For example, when 
the government imposes sales and excise taxes, annual incidence studies suggest that the consumption 
taxes paid in a year are typically regressive, since higher income households tend to save more than 
low-income households. Yet savings that are stored for future consumption purposes will be subject to 
future sales tax. Indeed, assuming that the return on savings is equal to the opportunity cost of investing 
capital in alternative assets (i.e., there are zero economic rents)7 and taking into account the time value of 
money, the purchase of future consumption goods is equal to current savings. Thus, savings are subject 
to the same sales tax burden as current consumption. Under annual incidence studies, regressive taxation 
under sales taxation is overestimated since future taxes on savings used for consumption are ignored.8 
Under lifetime incidence, the future sales taxes would be incorporated in a full analysis of tax incidence. 
Thirdly, income in a given year may be subject to significant fluctuations in response to business cycles, 
both at the higher end and the lower end of the income distribution (bonuses, layoffs, etc.). As a result, 
annual incidence may result in unusually high or low measures of taxes, depending upon the particular 
year chosen for reference, and income taxes appearing more progressive than they would be based on 
lifetime or permanent income measures. 
While we think that on theoretical grounds the lifetime approach is superior to use for assessing tax 
incidence and the progressivity of the tax system, the lifetime incidence approach requires longitudinal 
data or some approach whereby incomes and consumption can be estimated over time. Unfortunately, 
we do not yet have access to the appropriate data that allow us to undertake such a study. Therefore, 
we opt to undertake a static analysis based on annual income, with the innovation that we investigate 
incidence by age cohort. We recognize that the use of the annual incidence approach tends to bias 
results, showing less progressivity in the tax system since savings, exempt from consumption taxes, are 
more significant with upper-income groups. However, measuring tax rates for various age cohorts allows 
us to assess not only how tax rates differ by age and income groups today, but how one’s tax rates may 
evolve over a lifetime if the tax system does not change significantly compared to the reference point in 
2008.9
7 
People who save may intend to leave a bequest to children. Bequests consumed by children would be subject to sales taxes 
as well. It might be argued that bequests themselves should be taxed separately from the consumption of heirs since wealth 
transferred to children is a form of consumption. Therefore, sales taxes may be somewhat regressive since bequests are not 
subject to consumption taxes. 
8 
Edgar K. Browning and William R. Johnson originally made this point in The Distribution of the Tax Burden, American 
Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C. 1979. 
9 
Annual data can be used to simulate lifetime income profiles and infer lifetime incidence if assumptions are been made 
regarding earnings mobility over a lifetime. In James Davies, France St-Hilaire and John Whalley, “Some Calculations 
of Lifetime Tax Incidence,” The American Economic Review 74, no.4 (1984): 633-649, annual data are used to construct 
synthetic longitudinal lifetime income profiles in order to compare lifetime and annual tax incidence. Rather than following 
the same approach to simulate lifetime incidence results, we opt for a simpler annual incidence study where we report 
average tax rates for each age cohort separately. 
5III. OUR APPROACH
As discussed above, all tax incidence studies involve a number of modeling trade-offs and a myriad of 
assumptions. We discuss our assumptions here. 
As discussed, we employ a static microsimulation partial equilibrium approach and make various 
shifting assumptions based on the insights from general equilibrium models. In particular, we use the 
Statistics Canada SPSD/M (Social Policy Simulation Database/Model) program. 
The SPSD/M consists of a static microsimulation model (SPSM) and a synthetic database (SPSD). 
The database is created by combining data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) 
with administrative data from personal income tax returns, Employment Insurance histories from an 
administrative dataset and household expenditure patterns from the Survey of Household Spending. 
A key element of SPSD/M is the inclusion of commodity and sales taxes. In this regard, the SPSD/M 
employs an input-output model, COMTAX, which produces effective tax rates for 10 commodity taxes 
for each of the 48 personal expenditure categories. The COMTAX model assumes that firms pass their 
sales tax burden forward to the final consumer (and indeed this is the base shifting assumption we 
employ). As such, commodity taxes include both direct taxes (taxes paid by the final consumer) as well 
as indirect taxes (taxes from the intermediate stages of production and passed on to the final consumer 
which are included in the price of a good). COMTAX models consumption taxes for the statistical 
taxpayers, which mimic the profiles of actual consumers and taxpayers according to other data collected 
by Statistics Canada. 
The strength of the SPSD/M is the very high level of detail it employs in representing Canada’s tax 
and transfer system. However, there are two problems with using the model for incidence analysis. The 
first is that it reflects a number of naïve shifting assumptions, based on statutory rather than economic 
incidence, which are at odds with the economic literature on tax incidence. This requires us to make 
various adjustments to the data, which we describe in detail below. 
The second problem with the SPSD/M is that it is a static, annual model; it represents a snapshot of 
the earnings, transfers and taxes of taxpayers at a particular point in time. As discussed above, we 
think that a lifetime approach is ultimately better to understand the redistributive role of the tax and 
transfer system when data are available. Instead, we make the best use of annual data by examining 
the distribution of income and taxes within and across age cohorts in Canada. This involves using the 
SPSD/M to undertake a standard static or annual tax incidence study with the innovation that the data 
are parsed by age cohorts. As indicated above, most static studies of tax incidence group all cohorts 
together.
The static age cohort approach allows us to analyze how tax rates vary not only across income groups 
in general, but income groups within each age cohort, as well across ages for a particular income group. 
The downside is that, even though we agree that household income and taxes offer a more complete 
picture of actual tax burdens, we can only talk about age cohorts in a meaningful way by focusing on 
individual, as opposed to family, income. We restrict our analysis to individuals 20 years and older, with 
total income for tax purposes above zero in 2008.
6Our starting point focuses on four income variables reported by SPSD/M. We retrieve each of these 
values by age cohorts: 20-24, 25-29, etc., and within each cohort by income group, where individuals are 
split based on their total income into five quintiles (denoted QU1 to QU5). The four income variables are:
• Market Income (MI) = total income from market activities (including employment and self-
employment income, investment income, private pension income, etc., but excluding CPP/QPP 
income);
• Total Income (TI) = market income plus transfer income (including CPP/QPP income and 
employment insurance benefits);
• Disposable Income (DI) = total income minus total personal taxes except federal and provincial 
commodity taxes;
• Consumable Income (CI)10 = disposable income minus commodity and sales taxes.
Table 1 below shows the four income thresholds (corresponding to the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentiles) 
that define our income groups, for each age cohort and for the population in general, as well as the 
number of SPSD records in each age group. 
TABLE 1 TOTAL INCOME THRESHOLDS BY AGE COHORT (2008 $)
Age Records P20 P40 P60 P80
20-24 13,606 6,932 11,897 18,075 29,153
25-29 10,404 14,387 25,871 37,643 51,067
30-34 11,649 18,544 31,674 45,031 61,923
35-39 15,773 17,448 32,557 47,796 70,568
40-44 19,009 18,606 33,745 49,285 72,486
45-49 20,194 18,382 34,400 49,476 74,585
50-54 21,695 17,296 32,454 48,424 76,222
55-59 15,563 12,735 26,434 42,390 67,325
60-64 10,603 10,349 20,899 35,484 54,353
65-69 6,610 15,484 20,885 32,238 50,324
70-74 4,184 14,519 18,982 26,913 41,810
75+ 8,561 16,731 19,955 25,980 39,177
All ages 157,851 14,468 24,717 38,916 60,279
The four income definitions produced by the SPSD/M are based on various implicit tax shifting 
assumptions, some of which can be considered simplistic for reasons that are explained shortly. 
First, as mentioned above, under the COMTAX model embedded in SPSD/M, it is assumed that firms 
fully pass forward sales taxes (commodity taxes and general sales taxes such as the GST/HST and 
provincial sales taxes) to the final consumer of the product. Thus, taxpayers bear the entire burden of 
10 
Disposable and Consumable Income are easy to confuse. Disposable Income is Total Income (including transfers) minus all 
taxes except consumption taxes, while Consumable Income is Total Income minus total taxes, including consumption taxes. 
The difference between Disposable and Consumable Income is therefore consumption taxes. Consumable Income is not the 
same as consumption, but represents the income available to either consume or save, after all taxes have been paid. 
7sales and excise taxes in proportion to their consumption. This is relatively non-controversial, and we 
maintain this shifting assumption.11 
Second, the SPSD/M assumes that payroll and income taxes levied on employees are completely 
borne by labour, while payroll taxes levied on employers are borne by the business. Moreover, with 
regard to payroll taxes, Employment Insurance (EI) and CPP/QPP premiums are treated as taxes, 
while the resulting benefits are treated as transfers. Similarly, workers compensation and provincial 
health premiums are borne by labour. As discussed below, we make significantly different assumptions 
regarding the burden of payroll taxes and benefits in our analysis.
Third, corporate income taxes are ignored altogether in SPSD/M; we incorporate corporate income taxes 
in a manner described shortly. 
The differences between these income measures allow us to calculate several transfer and tax measures. 
For each group, we calculate the taxes paid and transfers received by the average person in each age-
income group. In particular: 
• Transfers = Total Income minus Market Income; 
This measure reflects all transfers received by individuals at the federal and provincial level (Old Age 
Security (OAS) payments, Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) benefits, spouses allowance, Child 
Tax Benefit, EI benefits, provincial family programs and social assistance, GIS top-ups, provincial tax 
credits, and others) including a share of their CPP/QPP income, as explained below.
• Personal Income, Payroll, and Other (PPO) Taxes (excluding consumption taxes) = Total Income 
minus Disposable Income;
This measure reflects all taxes paid by individuals to provincial and federal governments, directly or 
indirectly, with the exception of commodity and sales taxes. They include explicit taxes like personal 
income and payroll taxes, including CPP/QPP contributions, EI contributions, Workers’ Compensation, 
but also provincial health premiums, other taxes like Quebec’s parental insurance plan premium for paid 
workers and for self-employed, etc. We add to these the corporate income taxes and the employer share 
of payroll taxes, which are implicitly paid by labour and/or capital owners through lower wages and 
returns to capital (details on how this is done are given below).
• Consumption Taxes = Disposable Income minus Consumable Income;
This measure is generated by the commodity tax model (COMTAX) built in SPSD/M and accounts for 
eleven different commodity and sales taxes at the federal and provincial levels, including GST, HST, 
federal import duties, provincial profits on liquor commissions, federal fuel taxes, provincial fuel taxes, 
provincial sales taxes, etc.
Income Adjustments
As discussed above, the representation of income and taxes in the SPSD/M implicitly reflects what 
may be viewed as rather naïve shifting assumptions. To incorporate what we view as more reasonable 
assumptions as suggested by the literature, we operate some adjustments to the basic income measures 
11 
Some studies have suggested that roughly 90 percent of sales taxes on business inputs are shifted forward to consumers 
rather than shifted back to producers. See Michael Smart, “The Impact of Sales Tax Reform on Ontario Consumers: A 
First Look at the Evidence,” The School of Public Policy Research Papers 4, no.3 (2011) updated August 2012 and Jonathan 
Kesselman, “Consumer Impacts of BC’s Harmonized Sales Tax: Tax Grab or Pass-Through?” Canadian Public Policy 37, 
no.2 (2011): 139-162. 
8from the SPSD/M. These adjustments primarily concern corporate income taxes and the treatment of 
CPP/QPP payments and benefits. 
By way of summary, in our basic scenario we recalculate Market, Total, Disposable and Consumable 
Income based on the following assumptions (more detailed discussion is provided below):
• Since Canada is a relatively small open economy with mobile capital with some home-bias regarding 
equity investments, we assume that corporate income taxes are shifted to a large extent onto the less 
mobile factor — labour. Specifically, in our base case we assume that 30 percent of corporate income 
taxes paid by large corporations are borne by the owners of capital, by way of lower investment 
income, and 70 percent by labour through lower market wages. For small privately held corporations, 
we assume that the owners bear the entire burden of the corporate income tax. Since SPSD/M reports 
income net of the corporate income tax implicitly paid by labour and capital owners, we adjust it by 
adding corporate income taxes back to market and total income in proportion to labour earnings and 
investment income;
• In Canada both employers and employees pay payroll taxes like EI and CPP/QPP contributions, but 
SPSD/M only models the employee share. Since aggregate labour supply is relatively inelastic, it is 
reasonable to assume that employers are able to shift their share of payroll taxes onto employees in 
the form of lower wages. Thus, employer payroll taxes are an implicit tax on labour income, which 
again we add back to each individual’s total and market income. 
• SPSD/M treats CPP/QPP contributions as a pure tax and benefits as a pure transfer. Reality is more 
complex, as we think that it is more reasonable to treat CPP/QPP as a hybrid tax/transfer system 
and as a substitute for personal savings. Moreover, the extent to which this is the case varies by age 
cohort. Based on actuarial data we undertake age- specific adjustments to CPP/QPP contributions and 
benefits to reflect what we think are reasonable assumptions in this regard.
We elaborate on these assumptions in what follows.
Corporate Income Taxes
The burden of corporate income taxes has historically been one of the most contentious issues in public 
finance. In his pioneering general equilibrium model, Arnold Harberger12 showed that, depending upon 
the assumptions made about the nature of production and consumption, the corporate income tax, 
which is legally paid by corporations, could be borne by some or all of: owners of capital through lower 
rates of return on their investments, labour through lower wages, or consumers through higher prices 
charged on products and services. In Harberger’s original model, capital (and savings) is fixed in supply 
and the economy is closed to international capital flows — i.e., the stock of domestic savings equals the 
stock of domestic capital. Harberger showed that under what he considered the most reasonable set of 
assumptions —in particular that the corporate tax in the capital-intensive industries was differentially 
higher than in labour-intensive industries— capital owners fully bear the burden of corporate taxes by 
way of a lower after-tax return to capital. 
However, many have subsequently questioned this conclusion (including Harberger himself), and argued 
that part, and perhaps most, of the corporate income tax could fall on labour through a reduction in 
wages. Several arguments have been made in this vein. First, if total capital is not fixed in supply and 
depends on the amount of savings available to fund it, a lower rate of return on capital could cause 
investors to reduce savings by consuming more current goods and services. Second, corporate tax 
regimes could impose higher taxes on labour-intensive industries, especially if governments provide fast 
12 
Arnold C. Harberger, “The Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax,” Journal of Political Economy 70, no.3 (1962): 215-240. 
9write-offs for capital expenditures under the corporate income tax. Even though labour is substituted 
for capital in production, the labour-intensive products are more costly to produce, leading to a shift of 
demand toward capital-intensive products. Again, the corporate tax may therefore be partially borne by 
labour through lower wages. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Harberger’s original model was set in a closed economy, with 
no trade and no international capital flows. Things change markedly in an open economy setting 
where capital owners can shift their investments abroad if the rate of return on capital falls below the 
international rate of return on capital. For a small open economy, the shift of savings from a small 
country to world markets will not affect the rate of return on capital. Therefore, the corporate tax cannot 
be borne by capital owners who receive the same after-tax rate of return on capital no matter what the 
level of corporate tax. Instead, immobile factors of production in a small open economy, such as labour, 
must bear the corporate income tax. 
Indeed, Harberger himself illustrated this result in a follow-up to his original paper.13 For example, he 
shows in a simulation model that in an open economy labour bears almost 96 percent of the burden of 
CIT. In a similar vein, Randolph shows that labour bears 70 percent of CIT with fixed world capital 
stock.14
Of course, the world is much more complicated than suggested by simulation models. Some studies have 
shown that investors have a “home bias” to invest in domestic securities resulting from institutional 
or informational barriers to trade.15 If this is the case, corporate taxes could be borne in greater part 
by capital owners. Certainly, smaller corporations have little or no access to international markets, so 
that home bias is most important in these cases. This can be important because in Canada, Canadian-
controlled private corporations that claim the small business deduction earn roughly a third of corporate 
taxable income.16
As the above discussion shows, the incidence of the corporate income tax is a very complex issue, 
and can vary dramatically depending upon the underlying assumptions of the model. A key issue is 
the extent to which labour bears the burden of the corporate tax through lower wages. More recently, 
researchers have eschewed complicated general equilibrium calculations in favour of empirical studies 
that investigate the link between corporate taxes and wages directly. The results of four recent studies in 
this vein are summarized here:
• Arulampalam et al. (2012, p.1049): “a $1 increase in the tax liability leads to a 64 cents reduction in 
total compensation in the short run, and a 49 cents reduction in the long run.”17
• Felix (2009, p. 90): “In the case of the state corporate income tax, labor bears a significant burden 
from the tax in the form of lower wages. Regression analysis shows that a one-percentage-point 
increase in the marginal state corporate tax rate reduces wages 0.14 to 0.36 percent. Labor’s burden 
13 
Arnold C. Harberger, “Corporate Tax Incidence: Reflections on what is Known, Unknown, and Unknowable,” in 
Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications, ed. John W. Diamond and George R. Zodrow. (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, (2006).
14 
William G. Randolph, “International Burdens of the Corporate Income Tax,” Congressional Budget Office Working Paper 
no.9 (2006).
15 
See, for example, Piet Sercu and Rosanne Vanpée, “Home Bias in International Portfolios: A Review,” Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Department of Accountancy, Finance and Insurance Research Report AFI 0710 (2007). Canada’s 
share of world equity capital markets in 2005 is 3.5 percent but Canadian holdings of domestic equity securities are 76.6 
percent, suggesting significant home bias in equity markets. Netherlands displays the least home bias with only 32.1 percent 
of domestic equity securities held by the Dutch. 
16 Data provided by the Department of Finance.
17 
Wiji Arulampalam, Michael P. Devereux and Giorgia Maffini, “The Direct Incidence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages,” 
European Economic Review 56, no.6 (2012): 1038-1054.
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from the state corporate tax has trended upward over time. In the 1990s and early 2000s, wages 
began falling more in response to higher corporate tax rates than in the late 1970s and 1980s.”18
• Hassett and Mathur (2006, p. 25): “The results in this paper suggest that corporate tax rates affect 
wage levels across countries. Higher corporate taxes lead to lower wages. A 1 percent increase in 
corporate tax rates is associated with nearly a 1 percent drop in wage rates.”19
• Liu and Altshuler (2013, abstract): “Over all industries, our estimates suggest that a $1.00 increase in 
corporate tax revenue decreases wages by approximately $0.60.”20
While some have questioned the magnitude of these estimated effects,21 in our view a reasonable 
interpretation of the research is that there is an emerging consensus that labour bears a significant share 
of the corporate income tax (CIT) by way of lower wages. In our base case calculations we therefore 
assume that 70 percent of the burden of corporate income taxes falls on labour and 30 percent on capital. 
As discussed below, we also consider an alternative scenario where the entire burden falls on capital. 
Importantly, our approach also distinguishes between large and small corporations. As indicated above, 
since small businesses have less access to international capital markets compared to large businesses, we 
think it is more reasonable to assume that the owners of small businesses bear more of the burden of the 
corporate tax compared to the owners of large businesses. Since in our dataset self-employment income 
is included in labour income, by treating differently the effect of corporate taxes on labour and capital 
income we implicitly treat differently small and large businesses, with a greater share of corporate taxes 
borne by small business owners than large business owners in our preferred scenario. 
CPP/QPP Contributions and Benefits
Some taxes, particularly payroll taxes, are contributions to government-operated social security 
programs such as the CPP/QPP, EI and provincial workers’ compensation programs. These taxes 
typically entail a maximum annual contribution that is binding for higher income individuals. This 
means that treating payroll contributions as pure taxes without adjusting for program benefits will tend 
to overstate the regressivity of payroll taxes. Our approach is to treat CPP/QPP payroll contributions 
as a combination of savings and taxes, with the ratio between the tax/transfer and saving components 
changing by age cohort, depending on the implied rate of return on the CPP/QPP contributions. 
A key issue that motivates our treatment of CPP/QPP contributions and benefits concerns the extent to 
which public pension plans are a substitute for private savings. From a macroeconomic perspective this 
is a very important issue, especially for pay-as-you-go plans, as it concerns how public pensions affect 
aggregate savings. With pay-as-you-go public pensions, any reduction in private savings in response to 
public pensions will decrease aggregate savings in the economy. From the microeconomic perspective 
of this study, the key issue is whether the contributions of those currently working to CPP/QPP should 
be viewed as taxes or as a substitute for savings, and in turn whether the benefits received by current 
retirees should be viewed as transfers or as the return to savings. This has a significant impact on how 
taxes and transfers are represented.
18 
R. Alison Felix, “Do State Corporate Income Taxes Reduce Wages?,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Review, Second 
Quarter (2009).
19 
Kevin A. Hassett and Aparna Mathur, “Taxes and Wages,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 
Working Paper no.128 (2006).
20 
Li Liu and Rosanne Altshuler, “Measuring The Burden Of The Corporate Income Tax Under Imperfect Competition,” 
National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, 66, no.1 (2013): 215-37.
21 
See, for example, Jennifer C. Gravelle, “Corporate Tax Incidence: A Review of Empirical Estimates and Analysis,” 
Congressional Budget Office Working Paper 2011-01 (2011).
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Most early public pension plans, including Canada’s, were initially based on the pay-as-you-go principle. 
Under this approach there is no explicit connection between the benefits received on retirement and the 
amount contributed — current benefits are paid for out of current contributions (i.e., current workers 
pay the benefits of retirees). Even in this case, however, standard life-cycle models of consumer savings 
suggest that public pensions crowd out, or displace, private savings, since one the main reason people 
save is to provide for themselves after retirement.
Martin Feldstein’s pioneering study of the US social security system in the 1970s was among the first 
empirical studies of the issue.22 He found that social security in the US had a large and statistically 
significant impact on private savings, although the displacement was less than one to one. This suggests 
that households treat public pensions as at least a partial substitute for savings. However, his results have 
been questioned in numerous subsequent studies. A somewhat dated review of the evidence suggests that 
public pensions reduce private savings by between zero and 50 cents per dollar.23
The CPP is currently neither a pay-as-you-go nor a fully funded plan. Reforms in 1997 introduced partial 
funding with the goal of restoring the financial sustainability of the plan, which was previously run on a 
pay-as-you-go basis.24 Since the reform, the plan can be characterized as a hybrid between a pay-as-you-
go system and a fully funded system, referred to as “steady-state funding,” whereby the contribution rate 
is set at the lowest level that is sufficient to ensure the long-term stability of the plan without further rate 
increases. 
The implication of this is that on a present value basis current recipients of CPP income, as well as some 
soon-to-retire participants, receive more from the pension plan than they would have if they had simply 
saved their contibutions, while younger cohorts will receive less. Indeed, the CPP actuarial report for 
2009 indicates that the real rate of return on CPP assets varies significantly by age cohort. While the 
long-term rate of return for all contributors is 4.0 percent,25 it declines from 6.3 percent for those born 
in 1940 to only 2.3 percent for those born in 2000.26 As the report puts it it, “the differences provide an 
indication of the degree of intergenerational transfer present in the Plan.”
We take what we think is a novel approach to dealing with CPP/QPP contributions and benefits, treating 
them in part as taxes and transfers and in part as savings and return to savings, depending upon the 
22 
Martin Feldstein, “Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation,” Journal of Political 
Economy 82, no.5 (1974): 905-926; Martin S. Feldstein and Anthony J. Pellechio, “Social Security and Household Wealth 
Accumulation: New Microeconomic Evidence,” Review of Economics and Statistics 61, no.3 (1979): 361-368.
23 
See for example, “Social Security and Private Savings: A Review of the Evidence,” Congressional Budget Office, 
Washington D.C., July 1998.
24 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada Report, “Intergenerational Balance of the Canadian 
Retirement Income System,” by Chief Actuary Jean-Claude Ménard and Actuary Assia Billig prepared for the International 
Social Security Association Technical Seminar on Proactive and Preventive Approaches in Social Security-Supporting 
Sustainability, Muscat, Oman 23-24 February 2013 available at http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/oca-bac/sp-ds/Pages/
jcm20130224.aspx
25 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, “Actuarial report 25th on the Canada Pension Plan as at 31 
December 2009,” 3 November 2010, p. 22.
26 Ibid., p.74.
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age cohort.27 In our calculations, we assume that the average individual contributes to CPP/QPP for 
40 years and benefits for 20 years, and the benchmark real rate of return on retirement savings is four 
percent. By comparing the benchmark rate of return with the actual age-specific rate of return on CPP 
contributions, we estimate the degree to which current CPP/QPP contributions by younger cohorts 
can be viewed as a tax (benefiting older cohorts) versus saving for one’s own retirement. Similarly, we 
estimate the proportion in which current CPP/QPP income can be viewed as a transfer versus return to 
past contributions/savings. Our estimates are summarized in the table below. 
TABLE 2 ESTIMATED TAX AND TRANSFER COMPONENTS OF CPP/QPP BY AGE COHORT
Birth Year Actual IRR Transfer component of  CPP/QPP Income
Tax component of  
CPP/QPP Contributions
1940 6.3% 53.4% 0%
1950 4.2% 6.4% 0%
1960 3.0% 0% 27.8%
1970 2.4% 0% 40.5%
1980 2.3% 0% 42.3%
1990 2.2% 0% 44.1%
2000 2.3% 0% 42.3%
Source: Authors’ calculation.
We apply these percentages to split the current CPP/QPP contributions for each age cohort into a tax 
component and a saving component, and we include the latter in their disposable and consumable 
income. For the older cohorts, we treat part of their CPP/QPP income as transfer and part as return to 
savings or earned pension income, and we include the earned portion in their market income. 
As a general rule, the tax component of the CPP/QPP contributions decreases with age, and the transfer 
component of the CPP/QPP contributions increases with age, as older cohorts benefit more from the 
system than younger ones. However, two groups of individuals in our dataset do not fit in this pattern 
and are treated differently:
• Some people receive CPP/QPP benefits before the standard retirement age of 60-65, mostly in 
the form of disability benefits, survivor’s pension and children’s benefits. The rules to qualify for 
these benefits and the amounts paid by the system are not exclusively related to past CPP/QPP 
contributions, thus for simplicity we treat all CPP/QPP benefits received by individuals younger than 
60 as transfers. 
• On the other hand, we have people who continue to work and contribute toward CPP/QPP after the 
standard retirement age of 65. For this group we assume that their current CPP/QPP contributions 
partly offset their smaller past contributions, and it is unlikely that their overall contribution to CPP/
QPP exceeds the benefits the plan will provide (as it does for the younger cohorts.) Since these people  
 
27 
Unlike CPP, the Québec Pension Plan was from its inception based on a partly funded approach — a combination between 
pay-as-you-go and fully funding. According to the “Actuarial report of the Quebec Pension Plan as at 31 December 2009,” 
the contribution rate has been raised several times due to economic and demographic pressures, but the plan is still not fully 
funded. A reform in 1998 resulting in an abrupt increase in the contribution rate from 6.0 percent in 1997 to 9.9 percent in 
2003 was intended to ensure long-term funding, as well as “fairness between generations of contributors.” This implies that 
current contributors to the plan have to contribute more compared to previous generations to enjoy similar benefits, which 
justifies a similar treatment for QPP as we undertake for CPP. Current QPP contributions are in part a tax that supports 
older generations, and current QPP benefits are in part a transfer from the younger to the older contributors. For lack of 
specific data regarding the rate of return of the Québec Pension Plan by age cohort, we use the same rates derived from the 
CPP actuarial report to break down the QPP contributions and benefits into a tax/transfer and a saving component.
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will be the sole beneficiaries of their current CPP/QPP contributions, we treat their current CPP/QPP 
contributions entirely as saving and include them in their disposable and consumable income. 
With these assumptions, we add the current CPP/QPP contributions and income of each age cohort to 
the appropriate income categories, based on the rates outlined in Table 3 below. When we look at all 
ages together, the share of CPP/QPP income that should be treated as return to savings or market income 
and the share of current contributions that should be treated as saving are calculated as a weighted 
average across all age cohorts, using as weights the total CPP/QPP income and CPP/QPP contribution, 
respectively, of each age cohort.
TABLE 3 ESTIMATED SAVING COMPONENT OF CURRENT CPP/QPP  
  CONTRIBUTIONS AND INCOME BY AGE COHORT
Age Cohort
Current CPP/QPP Contributions 
Representing Saving for Retirement 
(added to Disposable and Consumable Income)
Current CPP/QPP Income  
Representing Return to Savings













All ages 74.4% 42.3%
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Employment Insurance Contributions/Income
An argument could be made that the EI program is like any other insurance program: people contribute 
to EI to insure against the risk of losing their job, and the EI income represents the payout from this 
insurance. However, several features of the EI program in Canada contradict this argument. While it is a 
government-provided insurance program against unemployment, the EI program is not actuarially fair. 
Individuals in high-unemployment regions qualify more easily for EI, and also benefit from it for longer 
periods of time than those in low-unemployment regions. Moreover, there is no employer experience 
rating of EI contribution rates, whereby firms pay higher premiums if they tend to lay off workers more 
than others (such experience rating is used in the United States). Thus, the EI program has an important 
redistribution component, and we therefore treat EI contributions (employer and employee) as payroll 
taxes and EI benefits as transfers from government.
One element that is missing from our analysis is property taxes. One reason for excluding them is 
our choice to work with individual-level data, while property taxes are incurred at household level. 
Theoretically household taxes could be imputed to the individual members of the household on the basis 
of consumption of household services, however this is difficult to measure. Moreover, the economic 
incidence of property taxes is not entirely settled in the literature. Some argue that property taxes are a 
benefit tax that falls on a property’s consumption of municipal services, and therefore regressive, while 
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others believe that the property tax is a tax on capital, unrelated to the amount of municipal services 
consumed, and progressive like other capital taxes.28 A related issue involves the inclusion of implicit 
rental income from owner-occupied housing income. Again, we have chosen not to include this due to 
measurement issues.
A cursory investigation of the implications of omitting property taxes from the analysis suggests that 
little would change. Property tax rates calculated as a ratio to total income range from 0.4 percent to 5.5 
percent, generally increasing with age for all income groups and decreasing with income within each 
cohort, with an average for all taxpayers of 1.5 percent. However, the measure of income used in this 
calculation does not include implicit income from owner-occupied housing, which would tend to lower 
the ratios, especially for older cohorts who are more likely to own their houses. As such, we do not think 
that adding property taxes to the mix will alter the overall picture, and total tax rates would remain 
generally progressive for all ages with some exceptions for the first quintile. Within each income group, 
for all except the first quintile, total tax rates including property taxes would still increase with age, peak 
around the age of 50 and then decline, following the same hump-shaped profile that is typical for total 
and market income. 
A summary of our incidence and tax shifting assumptions alongside the assumptions made in three 
previous tax incidence studies for Canada is included in Appendix A. 
IV. OUR INCOME MEASURES
The four income measures retrieved from SPSD/M and adjusted to account for the CIT, employer share 
of CPP/QPP and EI as well as the treatment of CPP/QPP as discussed above, are illustrated in Appendix 
B, with a separate diagram for each income quintile. The dark solid line represents the market income 
adjusted as decribed previously, or the pre-fisc income. This is the income individuals earn exclusively 
as a result of market participation. The light solid line represents consumable income, or post-fisc 
income — what individuals have available to consume or save after paying various taxes and receiving 
various transfers from the government. In between we have total income (market income plus transfers) 
and disposable income (total income minus taxes, with the exception of consumption taxes). 
There are several points of interest:
• Even though our diagrams group together different individuals of various ages in a particular income 
group, the income curves look remarkably similar to typical lifetime income profiles. In fact, these 
diagrams show how lifetime income profiles would likely look if there were little to no income 
mobility, and individuals stayed in the same income quintile throughout their lifetime. Market 
income in particular has the expected hump shape: it grows slightly over the first two decades of the 
active life, peaks around the age of 45-50 (earlier for the first three quintiles, later for the fourth and 
the fifth) then declines more abruptly than it has increased over the second part of the active life. The 
peak is more pronounced and the decline more abrupt for the top 20 percent individuals (the fifth 
quintile.) 
• For the mid quintiles (second, third and fourth) market income exceeds consumable income for most 
or all pre-retirement age groups, after which consumable income surpasses market income around 
the age of 55-65. Thus, taxpayers in these income groups are net contributors to the fisc during 
their active life and become net recipients in their retirement. CPP/QPP as well as OAS and GIS 
play a large role in this, even though, as previously explained, we do not treat CPP/QPP benefits as 
28 
For more on the property tax incidence see Heather Kerr, Ken McKenzie and Jack Mintz eds., Tax Policy in Canada, 
Chapter 9. Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, Canada (2012). 
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pure transfers, but instead we break them down into an earned/return to savings component which 
is included in market income, and a transfer component which is included in the disposable and 
consumable income.
• However, for the first quintile, consumable income exceeds market income for all age cohorts, thus 
this income group is a net recipient from the fisc at any age. 
• At the other extreme, for the top income earners in the fifth quintile, market income exceeds 
consumable income at any age, making these individuals on average net contributors to the fisc even 
in their retirement years. Moreover, market income also exceeds disposable income for this group, 
which means that individuals in this income group pay more in taxes than they receive in transfers, 
even if we were to exclude consumption taxes, typically viewed as regressive. In fact, their market 
and total income are almost identical before the age of 60 and only slightly depart after this point, 
which implies that transfers for this income group are almost insignificant relative to their income 
during their active life. This is the group for which the maximum CPP contribution is likely binding 
for most of their active years, and post-retirement income is too large to qualify for GIS.29
• For all income groups except the first quintile, income is visibly smaller post-retirement compared 
to the peak earning years; the private and public pension plans as well as the other government 
programs geared toward the elderly cannot offset the natural decline in market income that comes 
with age. 
• The first quintile, however, enjoys a significant increase in income after the age of 65. Despite some 
taxes, in particular consumption taxes, being regressive (as discussed below), for this particular 
income group the post-fisc income far exceeds their pre-fisc income, by a magnitude of more than 
four at the age of 70-74 (consumable income of $9,324 versus market income of $2,081) to almost six 
past the age of 75 (consumable income of $11,961 versus market income of $2,058).
V. AVERAGE TAX/TRANSFER RATES BY AGE COHORT
The difference between market income and consumable income is the result of transfers received and 
taxes paid by each individual. We report two aggregate measures of taxes and the corresponding tax 
rates:
• Total Taxes, which are equal to total income minus consumable income. Total taxes show the total 
contribution to the fisc out of the income that has been supplemented by transfers, and as such they 
are always positive. 
• Total Tax Rate, equal to total taxes as a percentage of total income. It shows the average tax rate for 
the average individual in each age-income group. Note again that this measure ignores any transfers 
received by individuals that may offset their taxes, but does include transfers in the total income in 
the denominator. Thus it is always positive, even though some individuals receive more in transfers 
than they pay in taxes.
29 
CPP/QPP benefits are based on contributors’ earning history, but there is an annual cap typically binding for above 
average earners. In 2008, the maximum CPP pensionable earnings amount was set at $44,900, with a maximum CPP/
QPP contribution of $2,049.30 (each of the employer and employee portions). In turn, the maximum CPP benefit for 2008 
was $10,614. Starting with the age of 65 Canadians are also eligible for the Old Age Security (OAS) pension, which is 
independent of their employment history. The combined annual maximum for CPP and OAS for 2008 was $16,641.72. In 
addition, low-income (below $15,672 in 2008) recipients of OAS also qualify for the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS). 
That is obviously not the case for individuals in the top quintile with total income in 2008 exceeding $72,000 on average for 
the 70-74 age cohort.
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• Net Taxes, which equal total taxes minus transfers, or market income minus consumable income. 
This figure shows the net contribution to the fisc by the average individual in each group, which can 
be positive or negative, with the sign indicating whether an individual is a net contributor to or net 
recipient of the fisc.
• Net Tax Rate, which shows net taxes as a percentage of market income. This definition eliminates 
government transfers from both the numerator and the denominator of the tax rate, focusing instead 
on taxes paid out of pre-fisc income. For individuals with little or no market income, especially those 
aged 65 or older, the net tax rates are negative and unusually large in absolute value. 
Table 4 below illustrates the total tax rates across age and income groups.
TABLE 4 TOTAL TAX RATES (TAXES PAID AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME)
QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 17.0% 16.6% 18.2% 23.3% 30.7% 21.1%
25-29 15.6% 21.9% 27.6% 31.4% 34.0% 26.1%
30-34 15.8% 23.9% 28.5% 31.7% 35.1% 27.0%
35-39 19.1% 23.3% 28.3% 31.9% 36.5% 27.8%
40-44 17.4% 23.1% 28.1% 31.3% 36.3% 27.2%
45-49 18.5% 24.8% 28.3% 31.4% 36.1% 27.8%
50-54 17.6% 22.6% 26.6% 29.8% 36.4% 26.6%
55-59 24.8% 20.3% 25.1% 29.0% 34.7% 26.8%
60-64 27.3% 18.0% 23.6% 26.6% 33.2% 25.7%
65-69 14.8% 12.9% 17.7% 22.0% 31.0% 19.7%
70-74 14.0% 12.1% 15.4% 19.4% 26.7% 17.5%
75+ 12.4% 11.8% 13.7% 19.9% 28.7% 17.3%
All ages 17.3% 17.9% 24.5% 28.8% 34.9% 24.7%
The last row in Table 4 groups all ages together and shows the total tax rate for the average taxpayer in 
each income group. The tax rates generally increase with income: the first two quintiles have an average 
tax rate of 17-18 percent of their total income, increasing to approximately 35 percent for the individuals 
in the top 20 percent of the income distribution. This suggests that the tax system is overall progressive 
when looking at the entire population (20 and older).30 
When we compare tax rates across income groups within age cohorts and across age within income 
groups conclusions become more nuanced. Tax rates range between 11.8 percent for the average person 
75 and older in the second quintile of the income distribution to 36.5 percent for the average 35-39 year 
old in the top 20 percent of income distribution. Total tax rates generally increase with income within 
each age cohort, again with the notable exception of the poorest income group. Their tax rates are lower 
than for the rest of the taxpayers only between the ages of 25 to 55. After the age of 55 individuals in the 
bottom 20 percent have higher tax rates than those in the second quintile, and for the 60-64 age cohort, 
the total tax rate of the lowest quintile is even larger than the tax rates of the third and fourth quintile 
(27.3 percent for QU1 versus 18.0 percent for QU2, 23.6 percent for QU3 and 26.6 percent for QU4). 
The higher tax rates of the poorest group at this age are not due to higher taxes paid in dollar terms 
(in absolute terms their total taxes decline slightly after the age of 50 and generally fluctuate between 
$1,439 and $1,693 beginning with the age of 55), but to the abrupt decrease in their market income after 
the age of 55, with transfers only increasing after the age of 65. These numbers suggest that the lower 
30 
The last cell in Table 4 reflects the average tax rate among the five income groups for the population of all ages. That is, 
each income group is given the same weight. Alternatively, the average taxpayer in our dataset pays $14,072 in taxes relative 
to $47,056 in total income, which implies a total tax rate of 29.9 percent.
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income individuals are particularly vulnerable in their pre-retirement years when they are too old to earn 
significant income through market participation, but too young to qualify for some of the government 
programs like GIS and OAS. We address this issue in more detail at the end of this section.
Regarding the age distribution, for all except the lowest income group tax rates follow a similar pattern. 
They increase substantially from the 20-24 to the 25-29 age cohort, as students are generally out of 
college and tuition tax credits are no longer available, but also as individuals in general gain work 
experience which naturally translates into increases in their market income. After the age of 29, tax 
rates increase very slightly with age (between 0.7 and 3.6 percentage points), peaking around the age 
of 50. Beyond the age of 50, tax rates gradually decline, and for the top two income quintiles the tax 
rates experience a slight increase after the age of 75. The fact that tax rates peak about the same time as 
income peaks for all but the first quintile is another argument in support of our view that the Canadian 
tax system is generally progressive, albeit a weaker one, since the increase in tax rates over the peak 
earning years is much less pronounced than the increase in market and total income. 
However, total tax rates offer an incomplete picture of taxpayers’ contributions to the fisc. A substantial 
part of taxes paid may come from public transfers rather than earned market income. Table 5 below 
reports transfer rates across age and income groups, calculated as a percentage of total income. We 
include all the transfers that individuals receive from the federal and provincial governments including 
EI benefits, OAS, GIS, and part of their CPP/QPP income, but excluding the share of CPP/QPP income 
that we model as return to savings.
TABLE 5 TRANSFER RATES (TRANSFERS RECEIVED AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME)
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 17.7% 15.1% 10.5% 9.8% 3.1% 11.2%
25-29 39.0% 20.0% 10.0% 3.3% 0.9% 14.6%
30-34 46.5% 20.3% 10.3% 3.8% 1.4% 16.5%
35-39 39.3% 20.4% 8.5% 2.8% 0.5% 14.3%
40-44 38.3% 17.5% 5.6% 2.1% 0.4% 12.8%
45-49 37.8% 13.2% 5.2% 2.2% 0.5% 11.8%
50-54 37.9% 13.2% 4.3% 1.9% 0.4% 11.5%
55-59 45.3% 22.1% 7.1% 2.2% 0.6% 15.5%
60-64 45.0% 39.9% 17.6% 7.3% 1.9% 22.3%
65-69 80.3% 70.8% 45.1% 27.4% 10.2% 46.7%
70-74 80.8% 79.4% 51.8% 33.8% 13.2% 51.8%
75+ 84.9% 74.0% 53.3% 34.5% 13.4% 52.0%
All ages 44.0% 38.1% 15.8% 6.2% 1.4% 21.1%
For all income groups transfer rates fluctuate initially, then generally decline from age 30 to 55, and 
increase substantially after that, with the most dramatic increase after the age of 65. Within age cohorts 
transfer rates generally decline with total income, as one would expect. For the oldest age group enjoying 
the largest transfer rates, these rates decline with income from 84.9 percent for the average individual in 
the bottom 20 percent to 13.4 percent for the top 20 percent of income distribution.
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We next combine taxes paid and transfers received and report the corresponding net tax rates, calculated 
as a percentage of market or pre-fisc income in Table 6 below. 
TABLE 6 NET TAX RATES (TAXES MINUS TRANSFERS AS SHARE OF MARKET INCOME)
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 -0.9% 1.8% 8.6% 14.9% 28.4% 10.6%
25-29 -38.3% 2.3% 19.6% 29.1% 33.4% 9.2%
30-34 -57.2% 4.5% 20.3% 29.0% 34.2% 6.2%
35-39 -33.3% 3.6% 21.7% 29.9% 36.2% 11.6%
40-44 -33.9% 6.7% 23.9% 29.8% 36.0% 12.5%
45-49 -31.2% 13.3% 24.4% 29.8% 35.7% 14.4%
50-54 -32.7% 10.9% 23.3% 28.4% 36.2% 13.2%
55-59 -37.4% -2.3% 19.3% 27.3% 34.3% 8.3%
60-64 -32.2% -36.4% 7.2% 20.9% 31.9% -1.7%
65-69 -332.8% -197.7% -50.0% -7.5% 23.1% -112.8%
70-74 -348.1% -327.3% -75.4% -21.7% 15.5% -151.4%
75+ -481.3% -238.9% -84.9% -22.3% 17.7% -162.1%
All ages -47.7% -32.7% 10.3% 24.0% 34.0% -2.4%
When all age cohorts are considered together, the first two quintiles of the income distribution are net 
recipients of the fisc, with negative net taxes equal to -47.7 percent of their market income for the first 
quintile, and -32.7 percent for the second quintile. For the middle to high-income individuals net tax 
rates are positive and increase significantly with income, from 10.3 percent for the median group to 24.0 
percent for the fourth quintile and 34.0 percent for the fifth. Thus, the tax system is overall progressive 
when net taxes are considered. An interesting result is that the average net tax rate across the five income 
groups of all ages (weighted by population) is negative, albeit small, at -2.4 percent. An alternative way 
to look at the average net tax rate is to consider the average individual in our dataset who pays $9,695 in 
net taxes relative to a market income of $42,679, which implies a net tax rate for the average person of 
22.7 percent.
Looking at the net tax rates by age cohorts, other perhaps surprising facts come to light. The bottom 
20 percent of the income distribution is a net recipient of transfers for all ages considered. Moreover, 
they are not the only net recipients. Starting at the age of 65, all but the top 20 percent of the income 
distribution are net recipients from the fisc. Part of the reason is related to the targeted transfers for the 
elderly like GIS and OAS. But the result remains remarkable, especially given our choice of not treating 
CPP/QPP benefits as pure transfers, but instead breaking them into a transfer and an earned component. 
As indicated in Table 3, however, for those who were 60 or older in 2008, just 47 percent of their CPP/
QPP income appears to be a direct result of previous contributions, while the remaining 53 percent is a 
transfer from current CPP/QPP contributors. As these current contributors to CPP/QPP, who contribute 
more to the plan than their predecessors, retire in the future, this result may change and we may see 
fewer net recipients of the fisc among the elderly. 
What may also seem remarkable is the magnitude of some of the net tax rates, in particular for the 
individuals over the age of 65 in the bottom two quintiles with net tax rates between -198 percent and 
-481 percent. For them, transfers received net of taxes paid exceed their market income by a factor of 
two to five.
Within age cohorts, net tax rates generally increase with income, which is again consistent with our 
previous conclusion that federal and provincial taxes in Canada are generally progressive. Across ages 
we notice a similar pattern to what we have observed in the case of total tax rates. For the top three 
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quintiles net tax rates are almost flat during their most active years between 25 and 50, with only a slight 
increase with age, and ranging between 20 percent and 24 percent for the third quintile, 29 percent to 30 
percent for the fourth and 33 percent to 36 percent for the fifth. This is directly linked to the combination 
of taxes and transfers that vary across income groups as discussed below (see Figure 2). 
Decomposing the Taxes
We decompose total taxes and the corresponding tax rates into two main categories of taxes: Payroll, 
Personal Income and Other Taxes (PPO) and Consumption Taxes. 
PPO taxes include federal and provincial personal income taxes, both the employer and the employee 
share of payroll taxes, and other federal and provincial taxes paid by individuals, like provincial health 
premiums. They also include corporate income taxes indirectly paid by labour and capital owners, based 
on the incidence assumptions discussed above. Compared to the basic SPSD data, PPO taxes are also 
adjusted downward due to our treatment of part of CPP/QPP contributions as saving for retirement and 
not payroll taxes. Table 7 illustrates the distribution of PPO taxes across age and income groups.
TABLE 7 PERSONAL INCOME, PAYROLL AND OTHER (PPO) TAX RATES (AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME)
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 7.1% 8.3% 10.7% 16.0% 24.5% 13.3%
25-29 6.0% 13.8% 20.1% 24.4% 28.4% 18.5%
30-34 6.4% 15.7% 21.0% 25.3% 29.4% 19.6%
35-39 8.4% 14.8% 21.2% 25.4% 31.4% 20.2%
40-44 6.8% 15.1% 20.6% 24.9% 31.5% 19.8%
45-49 8.0% 16.4% 21.3% 25.0% 31.6% 20.4%
50-54 7.5% 14.6% 19.6% 23.3% 32.4% 19.5%
55-59 12.9% 12.0% 17.6% 21.9% 30.4% 19.0%
60-64 15.2% 8.4% 15.0% 19.2% 28.3% 17.2%
65-69 5.1% 3.4% 8.4% 13.2% 24.9% 11.0%
70-74 4.7% 1.8% 5.2% 10.7% 20.1% 8.5%
75+ 2.0% 2.2% 4.4% 10.5% 22.5% 8.3%
All ages 7.1% 9.0% 16.5% 21.8% 29.9% 16.9%
PPO taxes are the largest portion of taxes in our dataset and therefore display similar characteristics to 
total tax rates. After an initial jump around the age of 25, PPO taxes tend to increase only slightly with 
age up until around the age of 50 (55 for the top quintile) and then drop gradually. For the second and the 
fifth quintile, PPO taxes increase slightly beyond the age of 75. 
Within age cohorts, PPO taxes are typically progressive. Exceptions to this are the individuals aged 55 
to 75 in the lowest income quintile, who pay higher taxes not only compared to the second quintile, but 
even the third quintile within the 60-64 age cohort.31 For the remaining four quintiles, the PPO tax rate 
increases by an average of 5.8 percentage points moving from one quintile to the next in the income 
distribution. 
31 
However, as shown in Table 6 the net tax rates for the lowest income group are still by far the lowest of all quintiles for all 
age cohorts except 60-64, and negative throughout.
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Consumption taxes are modeled in SPSD/M and are not affected by our assumptions regarding the tax 
incidence of payroll or corporate income taxes, nor by our treatment of CPP/QPP contributions and 
benefits. We report consumption tax rates across age and income groups in Table 8 below using total 
income as tax base. 
TABLE 8 CONSUMPTION TAX RATES (AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME)
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 9.9% 8.3% 7.4% 7.3% 6.1% 7.8%
25-29 9.6% 8.1% 7.5% 7.0% 5.7% 7.6%
30-34 9.5% 8.2% 7.5% 6.4% 5.7% 7.4%
35-39 10.7% 8.5% 7.1% 6.4% 5.2% 7.6%
40-44 10.6% 8.0% 7.5% 6.4% 4.8% 7.5%
45-49 10.5% 8.4% 7.0% 6.4% 4.4% 7.3%
50-54 10.1% 8.0% 7.0% 6.5% 4.0% 7.1%
55-59 11.9% 8.3% 7.5% 7.0% 4.3% 7.8%
60-64 12.0% 9.6% 8.6% 7.4% 4.9% 8.5%
65-69 9.7% 9.6% 9.2% 8.7% 6.0% 8.7%
70-74 9.4% 10.3% 10.1% 8.7% 6.6% 9.0%
75+ 10.4% 9.5% 9.3% 9.4% 6.2% 9.0%
All ages 10.2% 8.9% 8.0% 6.9% 5.0% 7.8%
The literature on tax incidence seems to be in a general agreement that lower income groups save less 
and consume a larger proportion of their annual income than the more affluent taxpayers. Hence lower 
income groups are more affected by consumption taxes, which are therefore regressive under annual 
income incidence. Our figures confirm this view; when all age groups are considered, the average 
consumption tax rate is 7.8 percent, decreasing from 10.2 percent for the bottom quintile to only 5.0 
percent for the top quintile. Within age cohorts, consumption tax rates also generally decrease with 
income. One partial exception are again individuals in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution, 
whose consumption tax rates between the age of 70 and 75 are lower than for the next two quintiles, in 
part as a result of necessities like food, rent and medical expenses being exempt from sales taxes. 
Within the middle three quintiles consumption tax rates generally decline and then increase with age 
peaking around the age of 75, which is consistent with the fact that older people tend to save less and 
consume more of their income on an annual basis relative to younger ones. This is especially true in our 
analysis where part of savings consists of CPP/QPP contributions that decline with age.
A special type of taxes embedded in the PPO taxes reported above is what we label as implicit taxes. 
They include the CIT and the employer share of CPP/QPP and EI contributions. These taxes are not 
directly visible to those who ultimately bear them, since they are incurred at corporate level before 
these individuals observe their market income. They pay these taxes indirectly, in the form of lower 
wages and/or investment income as the corporate income taxes and the employer share of payroll taxes 
are shifted onto them. These taxes become observable as a result of the adjustments we make to the 
original SPSD/M data to account for the CIT and the employer share of payroll taxes. Their magnitude 
is influenced by our treatment of CPP/QPP contributions as part payroll taxes and part savings for 
retirement. The share of CPP/QPP contributions that we model as savings for retirement is improperly 
labeled as payroll tax, and we exclude it from implicit taxes (i.e., we treat it as a negative implicit 
tax). Since this share is increasing with age, it tends to reduce the implicit taxes across age cohorts 
approaching retirement age, when we assume that 100 percent of CPP/QPP contributions represent 
saving for retirement.
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We report the implicit tax rates calculated as the ratio of implicit taxes to total income in Table 9 below.
TABLE 9 IMPLICIT TAX RATES (AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME)
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 5.1% 4.9% 5.1% 5.2% 5.6% 5.2%
25-29 3.3% 4.6% 5.1% 5.3% 5.5% 4.8%
30-34 2.9% 4.3% 5.0% 5.1% 5.2% 4.5%
35-39 3.4% 4.3% 4.9% 5.1% 5.7% 4.7%
40-44 2.8% 3.5% 4.1% 4.3% 5.5% 4.0%
45-49 3.2% 3.8% 4.2% 4.2% 6.0% 4.3%
50-54 2.6% 2.1% 2.1% 2.8% 5.4% 3.0%
55-59 2.8% 2.3% 1.9% 2.6% 5.1% 3.0%
60-64 2.5% 2.2% 2.4% 2.5% 4.9% 2.9%
65-69 0.8% 1.0% 1.8% 2.2% 5.1% 2.2%
70-74 0.8% 0.6% 1.5% 1.5% 3.8% 1.6%
75+ 0.6% 1.1% 1.7% 2.4% 4.6% 2.1%
All ages 2.8% 2.6% 3.4% 3.8% 5.4% 3.6%
Although smaller relative to consumption taxes, implicit taxes still represent a significant share of total 
income, with an average implicit tax rate of 3.6 percent across the five quintiles.32 Implicit taxes are 
mildly progressive, increasing generally with income within each age cohort, with some exceptions 
within the bottom 40 percent of taxpayers. Interestingly, after the age of 50, the top income quintile has 
an implicit tax rate 1.9 to 2.5 times larger than the next income group. As predicted, the implicit tax rates 
also generally decrease with age within each income group (less so for the top income groups than the 
rest) and the population overall, from an average of 5.2 percent for the 20-24 cohort to 1.6 percent for 
the 70-74 cohort. The lowest implicit tax rate of 0.6 percent is incurred by the first quintile of income 
distribution in the 75+ age cohort, as well as the second quintile of the 70-74 age cohort. At the other end 
of the spectrum, the top 20 percent of earners in the 45-49 age group bear the highest implicit tax rate, at 
6.0 percent, due mainly to a large increase in capital income at this age and the 30 percent share of CIT 
borne by it. In absolute terms, the implicit tax rate peaks at the same time as market income and total 
income peak, around the age of 50-55.
Figure 1 below summarizes the tax rates discussed above for the entire population 20 years and older, as 
a percentage of total income, with transfer rates shown as negative taxes for comparison. The aggregate 
tax rate increases with income while the transfer rate decreases with income, evidence that when looking 
at the entire population the Canadian tax system is generally progressive.
32 
Once again, this is the average of the implicit tax rates for the five income groups of all ages. The implicit tax rate for the 
average taxpayer is slightly larger at 4.4 percent.
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FIGURE 1 TAX AND TRANSFER RATES ACROSS INCOME GROUPS, ALL AGES
Figure 2 summarizes the same tax rates across age cohorts, reinforcing our previous observations 
that Canada has a transfer system relatively generous for older cohorts, while tax rates exhibit a mild 
increase with age until around the age of 50, followed by a gradual decrease.
FIGURE 2 TAX AND TRANSFER RATES ACROSS AGES, ALL INCOME GROUPS
We return here to the comparison between the tax rates paid by the first two quintiles of the income 
distribution. With consumption taxes generally regarded as regressive in the literature, it is no surprise 
that the consumption tax rates for the first quintile are indeed larger than for the second, for all but the 
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70-74 cohort (Table 8). What may be surprising, however, is that between the ages of 55 and 75 the 
lowest income group also pays higher PPO taxes (Table 7), and overall higher total taxes relative to 
their total income (Table 4), even though we have found these taxes to be otherwise progressive. One of 
the possible reasons for this is our choice to work with individual income. Some of the lowest income 
earners may be members of higher income households, and their tax rates may be lower in the broader 
household context. However, there are several other factors behind this result, which we explore here. 
Table 10 below reports the income ratio of the first two quintiles for the main income definitions we use 
in this study.
TABLE 10 QU1/QU2 INCOME RATIO
  Market Income Total Income Disposable Income Consumable Income Labour Income Capital Income
20-24 39.5% 40.8% 41.3% 40.6% 38.2% 112.4%
25-29 31.3% 41.0% 44.8% 44.3% 30.1% 38.5%
30-34 26.2% 38.9% 43.2% 43.0% 24.6% 52.7%
35-39 28.9% 37.9% 40.8% 40.0% 26.9% 51.4%
40-44 28.4% 38.0% 41.7% 40.8% 24.4% 110.8%
45-49 26.6% 37.1% 40.9% 40.2% 23.5% 77.9%
50-54 24.6% 34.3% 37.2% 36.6% 18.3% 70.4%
55-59 22.4% 31.8% 31.5% 30.0% 18.5% 46.7%
60-64 30.7% 33.6% 31.1% 29.8% 17.5% 47.1%
65-69 41.8% 62.1% 61.0% 60.8% 22.4% 50.1%
70-74 59.9% 64.3% 62.4% 62.8% -275.9% 80.8%
75+ 42.8% 73.9% 74.1% 73.4% 467.5% 40.9%
All ages 38.4% 42.5% 43.4% 42.8% 38.9% 46.4%
The first quintile earns less than 40 percent of the market income earned by the second quintile prior 
to the age of 65, and slightly more after that, with an average of 38 percent for all age groups. With the 
addition of transfers though, the total income ratio is significantly improved to an average of 43 percent 
for all ages. However, the fiscal system does a much better job at equalizing income from the age of 65 
onward, where the total income ratio QU1 to QU2 increases above 0.6. After PPO taxes are being paid, 
which leads to the disposable income, for all ages except the 55-75 interval the disposable income ratio 
is still higher than the total income ratio. Thus income inequality is further reduced after PPO taxes are 
considered, which is another indication that PPO taxes are generally progressive. However this does not 
hold true for the lowest income quintile of the 55-75 age cohort, for whom the ratio of disposable income 
relative to the second quintile is approximately 1.4 percentage points lower than the total income ratio. 
With the exception of the 70-74 cohort, everybody else in the first quintile experiences a further decrease 
in their income ratio relative to the second quintile as consumption taxes are also subtracted to arrive at 
the consumable income ratio. 
When all taxes and transfers are considered together, the consumable income ratio QU1 to QU2 is 
higher than the market income ratio for all but the 60-64 age group. Thus, even though not all taxes are 
progressive, the overall fiscal system is progressive. For the 60-64 year-olds however, the average person 
in the bottom quintile earns 30.7 percent of the market income of the average person in the second 
quintile, but ends up with only 29.8 percent of the disposable income of the same person. In a sense, the 
fiscal system fails this group. These may be individuals who are too old to change careers and earn more 
income on their own, but too young to fully benefit from the generosity of the Canadian transfer system 
toward the elderly. 
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VI. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO: CORPORATE INCOME TAXES BORNE BY CAPITAL
Although we believe that in a small open economy labour bears most of the burden of corporate income 
taxes, we also consider the alternative scenario whereby the burden of the CIT falls entirely on owners 
of capital. This would correspond to either the view that equity capital is only provided domestically 
(extreme home bias), or the view that capital bears the tax up to the common world rate, and only the 
portion of CIT that is above the world rate can be shifted onto labour. However, since data published by 
Cansim show that roughly 30 percent of non-financial assets in Canada are owned by foreigners, in this 
scenario foreign capital owners will bear some of the CIT taxes. Thus for our alternative scenario we 
assume that 70 percent of CIT revenues are added back to Canadian capital income, while 30 percent of 
CIT in Canada is borne by foreign capital owners. 
Changing the CIT incidence assumption and the way we adjust incomes to account for this tax will 
modify individuals’ market income and total income relative to the previous scenario, but not their 
disposable and consumable income.33 By way of consequence, it will also affect the dollar amount of 
total and net taxes, as well as PPO taxes, including the implicit share of PPO taxes, but it will have 
no effect on the dollar amount of transfers and consumption taxes. The combined effect of changes in 
the income measures we use as a tax base, as well as some of the tax amounts, is that all tax rates will 
change relative to the previous scenario, but not necessarily in the same direction. 
We report the total tax rates, net tax rates, PPO tax rates, implicit tax rates and consumption tax rates for 
the new CIT treatment in Appendix C. Even without the specific numbers, one would expect the burden 
of CIT to be larger under the original scenario for all individuals that earn significantly more labour 
income relative to capital income; as a result their market and total income once adjusted for this tax 
should also be higher in the baseline scenario.34 As labour income tends to decline with age more than 
capital income, we would expect this to hold mostly for the younger individuals in our dataset.
Indeed, by comparing the actual data in the two scenarios, we note that the above inference is valid for 
all individuals up to the age of 50, regardless of the income group they belong to. It continues to hold for 
the middle three quintiles between the age of 50 and 60, and for the third and fourth quintile between 
the ages of 60 and 65. In summary, for all these age-income combinations changing the assumption 
regarding the CIT results in the following changes:
• Market and total income adjusted to account for the CIT paid fall in the new CIT scenario relative to 
the the baseline scenario;
• The implicit taxes paid, of which CIT is a major component, fall; PPO taxes, total taxes and net taxes 
fall by the same amount;
• With both the tax amount and the tax base falling by the same amount, the PPO tax rate, the implicit 
tax rate, the total and the net tax rates all decline;
• With only the tax base falling and the numerator staying constant, the transfer rate as well as the 
consumption tax rate will rise.
How much does the change in the assumption regarding the CIT incidence alter the picture? Not that 
much, it turns out. The total tax rates for all ages in the baseline and the alternative scenario are 17.3 
33 In the baseline model, adjusting incomes for the CIT paid entails increasing labour income by approximately 5 percent and 
investment income by approximately 19 percent. In the alternative scenario we only need to adjust capital income, which 
increases by approximately 45 percent. 
34 In our dataset, this applies to all individuals with a ratio of labour income to capital or investment income that exceeds 
approximately 5.5.
25
percent versus 16.7 percent for the first quintile, 17.9 percent vs. 17.1 percent for the second, 24.5 percent 
vs. 23.0 percent for the third, 28.8 percent vs. 27.0 percent for the fourth, and 34.9 percent vs. 34.4 
percent for the top income quintile. The weighted average total tax rate over all age-income groups is 
24.7 percent assuming the CIT falls mostly on labour, compared to 23.6 percent if we assume that CIT 
falls on capital. For those that experience a lower total tax rate under the alternative CIT incidence, 
this decline amounts to less than 2.0 percentage points on average, while for those that experience an 
increase in their total tax rate (the elderly), this increase is on average equal to only 1.1 percentage 
points.
One conclusion we can draw from this experiment is that the incidence of corporate taxes, while 
generating interesting theoretical debates, does not greatly influence the overall assessment of tax 
incidence in Canada, primarily because corporate income tax revenues represent a relatively small share 
of total revenue collected (e.g., less than a third of the personal income tax revenues).35
VII. INCOME INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION BY AGE COHORT
After accounting for who pays taxes, we undertake an analysis of the impact of taxation on income 
inequality and redistribution by age cohort. Most studies of income inequality do not distinguish by age, 
but rather focus on the entire population. It is also useful, however, to understand what is happening on 
an age basis.
To undertake the analysis we employ the concept of the Gini coefficient, which is a common measure of 
income dispersion. A Gini coefficient of zero represents perfect income equality (i.e., if all individuals 
had the same income), while a value of one represents maximum income inequality (i.e., if one 
individual has all of the income). Thus, higher values of the Gini coefficient represent more income 
inequality.
We calculate Gini coefficients on an age cohort basis for both market income (which we also refer to as 
pre-fisc income, before any taxes or transfers) and consumable income (post-fisc income). For market 
income we present the results under the assumption that labour bears most of the burden of the corporate 
income tax; the analysis for our alternative scenario where capital owners bear most of the burden is 
similar.
The Gini coefficient for all age groups for market income in our data set is 0.548; for consumable income 
it is 0.427. A couple of points are salient here. First, income inequality in terms of consumable income 
is lower than for market income. This reflects the fact discussed above that the tax and transfer system 
is progressive, and redistributes income from higher income groups to lower income groups. This is a 
standard result. Second, both the pre- and post-fisc Gini coefficients for our dataset are slightly higher 
than are typically calculated for Canada.36 This is the case for two reasons. The first is that our dataset is 
based on individual incomes only; this was necessary in order to undertake the cohort analysis that is the 
focus of this paper. The second is that, as discussed above, we adjust market and consumable income to 
account for corporate taxes, payroll taxes, etc. Both of these factors tend to increase the Gini coefficient.
Figure 10 presents pre- and post-fisc Gini coefficients by age cohorts against the overall Gini coefficient 
for all ages (20 years and older). Several things are noteworthy. Focusing first on market income, it is 
35 
See Chapter 1 in Kerr et al., Tax Policy in Canada (2012). In 2007, according to International Monetary Fund data, personal 
income tax revenues and corporate income tax revenues amounted to 12.4 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively, of Canadian 
GDP.
36 
See for example Kevin Milligan, “Income Inequality and Income Taxation in Canada: Trends in the Census, 1980-2005,” 
School of Public Policy Research Paper 6, no.24 (2013).
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evident that pre-fisc market income inequality increases with age. Starting at age 30 income inequality 
within an age cohort increases monotonically with age, leveling off at 65. As far as we know this is the 
first time that this tendency has been identified.
In terms of consumable income we see that, as we would expect, post-fisc income inequality is much 
lower than pre-fisc inequality due to the progressive nature of the tax and transfer system. Moreover, the 
trend in the post-fisc Gini generally tracks the pre-fisc Gini up to age 65 and then drops significantly, 
representing much lower post-fisc income inequality among older individuals. This reflects the high 
implicit transfers embedded in the CPP/QPP system discussed above, redistributive programs aimed 
at the lower income elderly, such as OAS and GIS, and features of the tax system such as the pension 
income amount, etc. 
It is also noteworthy that for all age groups except the 50-65 cohort, the age-specific post-fisc Gini 
coefficient is lower than the Gini coefficient for the entire population. Post-fisc income inequality in 
Canada is thus smaller in the context of age cohorts than a single Gini number calculated for the entire 
population might suggest. In other words, a significant factor behind income inequality in Canada may 
be age and natural income differences that occur over the course of a lifetime. 
This observation may have important policy implications, especially now that income inequality 
has emerged as the topic du jour. An increasing body of research highlights the increase in income 
inequality in the developed countries and calls for action. For example, in his popular book Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty highlights the role that capital income has played in 
increasing inequality.37 Our results suggest that this increased income inequality may be in part the 
result of increased life expectancy. Since market income and labour earnings in particular decrease 
with age after peaking around the age of 45-55, the longer people live and the larger the proportion of 
the elderly in the general population, the higher the Gini coefficient for pre-fisc income will be. It is 
important to emphasize again, however, that the Gini coefficient is significantly decreased in Canada 
through fiscal policy, especially for the elderly.
The very high degree of redistribution aimed at the older age cohorts in Canada is also illustrated in 
Figure 11, which presents the Redistribution Factor (R-Factor) by age cohort. The R-Factor is measured 
as the percentage decline in the pre-fisc Gini due to the tax and transfer system.38 The R-Factor is 
relatively stable across all age cohorts until about age 65, at which point it increases significantly. This 
again emphasizes the high degree of redistribution geared towards the elderly in Canada.
37 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Harvard University Press (2014).
38 
(Adjusted Market Income Gini – Adjusted Consumable Income Gini)/Adjusted Market Income Gini.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examine the incidence of taxes and transfers in Canada. The analysis is based on 
standard, or static, annual income measures.
Our analysis is unique in several ways. For the first time in a Canadian context, we disaggregate 
results by age group. Previous studies have examined tax incidence and redistribution across the entire 
population. Next, we take into account various assumptions regarding the economic incidence of taxes, 
especially with respect to business-level corporate and payroll taxes, which under our base scenario are 
shifted back to immobile factors such as labour through lower real incomes. We think that this scenario 
is the most reasonable one for a small open economy like Canada. We also use an innovative approach 
to analyze the incidence of CPP/QPP to account for its hybrid nature as a tax/transfer and pure saving 
system. 
Overall, we find that the Canadian tax/transfer system is quite progressive. In our base case scenario, 
when all age cohorts are considered together, and transfers are treated as negative taxes, the first two 
quintiles of the income distribution are net recipients of the fisc, with negative net taxes equal to -47.7 
percent of their adjusted market income for the first quintile, and -32.7 percent for the second quintile. 
For middle to high-income individuals net tax rates are positive and increase significantly with income, 
from 10.3 percent for the median group, to 24.0 percent for the fourth quintile and 34.0 percent for the 
fifth quintile. Thus, the tax system is overall quite progressive when net taxes are considered. 
Looking at the net tax rates by age cohort, we show that the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution 
is a net recipient of transfers for all ages. Moreover, on average for individuals 65 and over, all but the 
top 20 percent of the income distribution are net recipients from the fisc, with negative net tax rates. 
We also consider an alternative scenario regarding the incidence of corporate income taxes. While there 
are some differences, the overall results remain the same. This is largely due to the fact that corporate 
income tax revenue is quite low relative to personal income and consumption taxes.
We also undertake an examination of pre- and post-fisc income inequality across age cohorts, calculating 
within age group Gini coefficients for each cohort. To our knowledge this is the first time this has been 
done. We conclude that the degree of inequality varies significantly by age cohorts in Canada. Starting 
at age 30 income inequality within an age cohort rises monotonically with age, leveling off at 65. 
Moreover, we show that there is substantial redistribution on the part of the fisc for all age groups, with 
post-fisc inequality significantly lower than pre-fisc inequality. However, the degree of redistribution 
varies significantly by age group, with the degree of redistribution increasing sharply for those over 65 




COMPARATIVE VIEW OF TAX INCIDENCE ASSUMPTIONS
Our assumptions • Personal income taxes borne by income recipients.
• Payroll taxes: both employer and employee share borne by employees.
• Payroll tax treatment: 
• EI is a tax/transfer;
• CPP/QPP contributions are part savings for retirement and part payroll tax;
• CPP/QPP income is part market income and part transfers.
• Corporate income taxes (CIT):
• Baseline case: 70% of CIT borne by labour, 30% by capital;
• Alternative case: 70% of CIT borne by Canadian capital, 30% borne by foreign capital;
• The distributive series for CIT are employment income and investment income.
• Consumption taxes borne by consumers.
• Property taxes not included.
Davie et al. (1984),
”Some Calculations of Lifetime  
Tax Incidence”
• Income taxes borne by income recipients.
• Corporate and property taxes borne by recipients of investment income:
• The distributive series for taxes borne by capital in lifetime incidence calculations is the discounted value of all investment 
income received over a lifetime.
• Social security taxes borne by earnings recipients.
• Sales and excise taxes borne in proportion to consumption.
Vermaeten et al. (1994),
“Tax Incidence in Canada”
Standard case: 
• CIT borne by corporate capital up to the common world (US) tax rate; the differential rate (above world rate) borne by immobile 
domestic factors or consumer outlays.
• Payroll taxes: both employer and employee portion borne by employees.
• Property taxes: portion on land borne by owners, portion on residential structures borne by users, portion on commercial and 
farm structures borne by consumers.
Progressive Case
• Same treatment of CIT. 
• Payroll taxes: employee portion borne by employees; employer portion borne by owners of capital.
• Property taxes: both portion on land and on structures borne by owners.
Regressive Case
• CIT borne half by owners of corporate capital, half by consumers.
• Payroll taxes: employee portion borne by employees; employer portion borne by consumers.
• Property taxes: portion on land borne by owners, portion on residential structures borne by users, portion on commercial and 
farm structures borne by consumers.
 Lee, Marc (2007),
“Eroding Tax Fairness. Tax  
Incidence in Canada, 1990 to  
2005,” Canadian Centre for  
Policy Alternatives 
• CIT borne by corporate capital up to the common world/US tax rate; differential rate borne by consumers and employees.
• Payroll taxes borne by employees.
• Consumption and property taxes paid by businesses borne by employees through lower wages.
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APPENDIX B
INCOME MEASURES BY AGE AND INCOME GROUP
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APPENDIX C
TAX RATES FOR THE ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO - CIT BORNE BY CAPITAL
TABLE C1 TOTAL TAX RATES (AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME) 
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 14.8% 13.9% 15.3% 20.5% 28.4% 18.6%
25-29 13.7% 19.4% 25.0% 28.5% 31.8% 23.7%
30-34 14.5% 21.7% 26.1% 29.1% 32.9% 24.9%
35-39 17.9% 21.2% 25.7% 29.3% 35.3% 25.9%
40-44 16.3% 20.6% 25.5% 28.7% 35.5% 25.3%
45-49 18.0% 22.7% 25.8% 28.7% 35.9% 26.2%
50-54 17.6% 20.8% 24.3% 27.5% 36.4% 25.3%
55-59 25.8% 19.8% 23.4% 27.3% 34.7% 26.2%
60-64 28.6% 18.5% 23.4% 26.5% 33.7% 26.1%
65-69 15.5% 13.8% 18.8% 22.9% 32.9% 20.8%
70-74 14.8% 12.7% 16.8% 20.6% 29.0% 18.8%
75+ 13.1% 13.0% 15.4% 22.2% 31.7% 19.1%
All ages 16.7% 17.1% 23.0% 27.0% 34.4% 23.6%
TABLE C2 TRANSFER RATES (AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME) 
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 18.1% 15.6% 10.9% 10.2% 3.2% 11.6%
25-29 39.8% 20.7% 10.4% 3.4% 0.9% 15.0%
30-34 47.2% 20.9% 10.6% 3.9% 1.4% 16.8%
35-39 39.9% 21.0% 8.8% 2.9% 0.5% 14.6%
40-44 38.8% 18.1% 5.8% 2.2% 0.5% 13.0%
45-49 38.1% 13.5% 5.4% 2.2% 0.5% 11.9%
50-54 37.9% 13.5% 4.4% 1.9% 0.4% 11.6%
55-59 44.7% 22.2% 7.3% 2.3% 0.6% 15.4%
60-64 44.2% 39.7% 17.7% 7.3% 1.9% 22.1%
65-69 79.6% 70.0% 44.5% 27.1% 9.9% 46.2%
70-74 80.1% 78.8% 50.9% 33.3% 12.8% 51.2%
75+ 84.2% 72.9% 52.2% 33.5% 12.8% 51.1%
All ages 44.3% 38.5% 16.1% 6.4% 1.4% 21.3%
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TABLE C3 NET TAX RATES (TAXES MINUS TRANSFERS AS SHARE OF MARKET INCOME)
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 -4.1% -2.0% 5.0% 11.5% 26.0% 7.3%
25-29 -43.5% -1.6% 16.3% 26.0% 31.2% 5.7%
30-34 -61.9% 1.0% 17.4% 26.2% 32.0% 3.0%
35-39 -36.5% 0.3% 18.6% 27.1% 34.9% 8.9%
40-44 -36.9% 3.2% 20.9% 27.1% 35.2% 9.9%
45-49 -32.5% 10.6% 21.5% 27.1% 35.6% 12.5%
50-54 -32.7% 8.4% 20.8% 26.1% 36.2% 11.8%
55-59 -34.1% -3.1% 17.3% 25.7% 34.3% 8.0%
60-64 -27.8% -35.0% 6.9% 20.7% 32.4% -0.6%
65-69 -314.7% -187.8% -46.3% -5.8% 25.5% -105.7%
70-74 -327.8% -312.1% -69.5% -19.1% 18.6% -142.0%
75+ -451.6% -221.6% -77.0% -17.0% 21.6% -148.9%
All ages -49.5% -34.6% 8.2% 22.1% 33.4% -4.1%
TABLE C4 PERSONAL INCOME, PAYROLL, AND OTHER TAX RATES (AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME) 
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 4.6% 5.3% 7.6% 13.0% 22.0% 10.5%
25-29 3.8% 11.1% 17.2% 21.2% 25.9% 15.9%
30-34 4.9% 13.3% 18.4% 22.5% 27.1% 17.2%
35-39 7.1% 12.5% 18.3% 22.6% 30.0% 18.1%
40-44 5.5% 12.4% 17.7% 22.2% 30.6% 17.7%
45-49 7.4% 14.1% 18.5% 22.1% 31.5% 18.7%
50-54 7.5% 12.6% 17.1% 20.8% 32.4% 18.1%
55-59 14.1% 11.4% 15.7% 20.2% 30.4% 18.4%
60-64 16.8% 9.0% 14.8% 19.0% 28.8% 17.7%
65-69 5.9% 4.3% 9.7% 14.2% 27.0% 12.2%
70-74 5.5% 2.5% 6.8% 12.0% 22.6% 9.9%
75+ 2.8% 3.6% 6.4% 13.1% 25.7% 10.3%
All ages 6.4% 8.2% 14.9% 19.9% 29.4% 15.8%
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TABLE C5 IMPLICIT TAX RATES (AS SHARE OF TOTAL INCOME) 
  QU1 QU2 QU3 QU4 QU5 Average
20-24 2.6% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 2.4% 2.1%
25-29 1.1% 1.5% 1.7% 1.4% 2.3% 1.6%
30-34 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 1.4% 2.1% 1.7%
35-39 2.0% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 3.8% 2.1%
40-44 1.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.8% 4.2% 1.5%
45-49 2.6% 1.2% 0.8% 0.6% 5.7% 2.2%
50-54 2.6% -0.2% -1.0% -0.4% 5.5% 1.3%
55-59 4.1% 1.7% -0.4% 0.4% 5.1% 2.2%
60-64 4.3% 2.8% 2.2% 2.3% 5.6% 3.4%
65-69 1.7% 2.0% 3.1% 3.3% 7.7% 3.6%
70-74 1.7% 1.4% 3.1% 2.9% 6.8% 3.2%
75+ 1.4% 2.4% 3.7% 5.2% 8.5% 4.2%




The James S. & Barbara A. Palmer Chair in Public Policy
Jack M. Mintz was appointed the Palmer Chair in Public Policy at the University of Calgary in January 2008.
Widely published in the field of public economics, he was touted in a 2004 UK magazine publication as one of the 
world’s most influential tax experts. He serves as an Associate Editor of International Tax and Public Finance and 
the Canadian Tax Journal, and is a research fellow of CESifo, Munich, Germany, and the Centre for Business Taxation 
Institute, Oxford University. He is a regular contributor to the National Post, and has frequently published articles in 
other print media.
Dr. Mintz presently serves on several boards including Imperial Oil Limited, Morneau Shepell, and as Chair of the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. He is also appointed by the Federal Minister of Finance to the 
Economic Advisory Council to advise on economic planning.
Dr. Mintz has consulted widely with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, and various governments, businesses and non-profit organizations in Canada.
Daria Crisan is a research associate at The School of Public Policy, specializing in public finance and fiscal federalism. 
She has worked on projects related to horizontal and vertical tax competition in effective taxes in Canada, and the 
tax treatment of R&D across provinces. She was also involved in a study regarding the oil market diversification 
potential for Canada. Daria has taught numerous undergraduate courses in economics and is currently working 
toward completing her PhD in economics at the University of Calgary.
Kenneth J. McKenzie is a Professor in the Department of Economics and The School of Public Policy at the University 
of Calgary, where he has been since 1992. He received his B.Comm. from the University of Saskatchewan in 1982, 
his M.A. from the University of Calgary in 1985 and his Ph.D. from Queen’s University in 1990. From 1984 to 1986 he 
was an economist in the Tax Policy Branch of the federal Department of Finance. His first academic appointment 
was at the University of Toronto in 1990. His principal area of research is public economics, with an emphasis on 
taxation and political economy. Professor McKenzie has received the Harry Johnson Prize for the best article in the 
Canadian Journal of Economics (1996, with Herb Emery). He is a two time winner of the Douglas Purvis Memorial 
Prize for a published work of excellence relating to Canadian public policy (1999, with Ron Kneebone; 2010, with 
Natalia Sershun). In 2000 he was the recipient of the Faculty of Social Sciences Distinguished Research Award 
at the University of Calgary. He was the EnCana Scholar at the C.D. Howe Institute, where he delivered the 2001 
Benefactors Lecture, and has been a visiting fellow at research institutes in both Germany and Australia. He was the 
inaugural director in 2004 of the University of Calgary’s Institute for Advanced Policy Research. Professor McKenzie 
has acted as an advisor to governments and institutions at the international, federal and provincial levels. He has 
been on the Panel of Experts for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and has provided analysis 
and advice on tax policy to several developing countries. He has sat on the Taxation and Finance Committee of the 
Alberta Economic Development Authority, was a member of the Alberta Business Tax Review Committee in 2000, 
an expert advisor to the Financial Review Commission in Alberta in 2002, and involved in research for the federal 
government’s Technical Committee on Business Taxation in 1997. In 2007 he was a member of the Alberta Royalty 
Review Panel. Professor McKenzie has served on the Executive Council of the Canadian Economics Association, and 
on the editorial boards of the Canadian Journal of Economics and the Canadian Tax Journal and is past editor and 
associate editor of Canadian Public Policy. He served as Department Head in Economics from 2007-2010, and is 
currently Director of the Tax and Economic Growth Program in The School of Public Policy.
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